알림 목록

Analysis Area:  Ulsan Metropolitan City

Core Area: Entire 5 Districts and Counties

Agenda: Determining the causes of the simultaneous occurrence of a high-wage industrial structure and net youth outflow

Golden Time Type: High-wage Incumbency Trap

Reference Date: 2026.08.28

Version: Regional AX Golden Time Intelligence v3.2
 

In April 2024, the average monthly wage per permanent worker in Ulsan was 4,548,000 won, ranking second highest after Seoul and 10.9% higher than the national average. However, in the first quarter of 2025, Ulsan experienced a net outflow of 2,733 people, with a net migration rate of -1.8% for those in their 20s; this net outflow continued in the second quarter with 1,280 people overall and a -1.0% net outflow for those in their 20s. While high wages and the outflow of youth occurred simultaneously, the distribution of new youth hires by wage, company size, and job function cannot be separated from the city's average wage. If industrial competitiveness is interpreted solely based on average wages for the 2026–2028 period, the job structure that young people cannot access is obscured.  The problem for Ulsan lies not in being a city with low wage levels, but in being a city where the range of young people who can enter high-wage jobs is narrow.

In the third quarter of 2025, Ulsan experienced a net outflow of 1,000 people; while the net migration rate for those in their 20s was -1.3%, there was a net inflow of 0.1% for those in their 30s. Although the structure of youth migration is not a blanket outflow across all age groups but rather a separation into an outflow of those in their 20s during the education and first employment stages, and a partial return during the career and household formation stages, tracking data on the job and educational background of the outflowing youth is limited. If the number of first-time entrants decreases over the next two to three years, the pool of local talent supporting the return of those in their 30s will also shrink.  The leading indicator of population risk in Ulsan is the repeated net outflow of those in their 20s, rather than the total population.

In 2025, Ulsan's net migration rate for those in their 20s recorded consecutive negative figures, at -1.8% in the first quarter, -1.0% in the second, and -1.3% in the third. While the trend of net outflow persisted despite quarterly fluctuations in economic conditions and hiring, the structure has become entrenched as early-life migration rather than temporary employment-based movement; however, figures by reason for relocation are limited in publicly available data. If the same trend continues through 2026–2028, the shrinking youth population will trigger a chain reaction of decreased demand for births, consumption, housing, and local universities.  The outflow of youth from Ulsan is not a short-term economic phenomenon but a structural change with confirmed recurrence.

In the first quarter of 2025, the major regions for net outflow from Ulsan were Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Busan, while the main destinations for youth migration were Busan, Seoul, and Gyeongnam. Although migration occurred not only toward high-wage jobs in the Seoul metropolitan area but also to adjacent major cities and Gyeongnam, educational, occupational, and housing factors are not separated by destination. If the attractiveness of universities, service industries, culture, and networks in Busan and the Seoul metropolitan area is maintained over the next two to three years, it will be difficult to reverse migration solely based on manufacturing wages in Ulsan.  The outflow of youth is determined to be related to the breadth of available education, job roles, and living areas, rather than wage disparities.

Ulsan's high average wages are formed by an industrial structure characterized by a high proportion of large conglomerates in the automotive, shipbuilding, refining, and petrochemical sectors, as well as long-serving male workers. While the city's average wage reflects the compensation of current employees, it does not separately reveal the wages and job security of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the service sector, which are the first entry points for young people. If the scale of new hiring at large corporations remains lower than the wages of existing employees for two to three years, the gap between high-wage statistics and the opportunities perceived by young people widens further.  Ulsan's average wage is closer to the wages of insiders in existing industries than to the expected income of young people.

The Ministry of Employment and Labor's analysis of regional employment indicated that high-wage jobs are not evenly distributed across the entire region, and that polarization by company size and industry is linked to the outflow of youth. While Ulsan also exhibits differences in wages, benefits, and career paths between large corporations and their subcontractors, as well as between regular and non-regular workers, regional disparities specific to the youth demographic are not disclosed. Unless entry into the internal labor market is expanded by 2028, the outflow of youth will persist even if average wages rise.  Ulsan's high wages are assessed not as an attraction for youth across the entire city, but as compensation for a limited segment of the labor market.

Ulsan's automotive, shipbuilding, and petrochemical industries have established high wages and long-term employment centered on production, maintenance, and skilled trades. While the industrial transition is shifting toward SDVs, AI, robots, eco-friendly ships, and high-value-added materials, the regional scale of software, data, research, and service roles available to young people remains unconfirmed. If hiring for existing production positions decreases due to automation over the next two to three years and new digital roles are relocated to headquarters or the capital region, Ulsan's high-wage base and youth employment base will become separated.  There is insufficient evidence that future roles will remain in Ulsan even as the manufacturing transition proceeds.

Increased productivity and automation in large corporate factories protect the wages of existing skilled workers but can reduce the number of new personnel required to produce the same output. The absolute scale of youth hiring and the net effects of replacement and newly created jobs resulting from automation are not disclosed on a company-by-company basis. If the gap left by mandatory retirements between 2026 and 2028 is filled by robots, external personnel, and the restructuring of partner companies, young people will not have opportunities to enter the workforce even during an industrial boom.  The persistence of high wages in Ulsan's manufacturing sector and the expansion of youth employment are not indicators moving in the same direction.

While Ulsan’s finished vehicle, shipbuilding, and petrochemical production involve multi-level subcontractors, high wages and benefits are primarily concentrated within large corporations. Although the job market young people actually encounter is heavily dominated by subcontractors, regional data comparing wages, working hours, benefits, and promotion paths across companies is limited. If the gap between large corporations and subcontractors persists for two to three years, young people choose jobs of a similar caliber in other regions and broader living areas over lower-tier positions within the region.  The dual structure of Ulsan’s labor market drives young people out of the region rather than upgrading within it.

AX investments and industrial transition costs by partner companies can constrain job security and wage increases. As the pace of transitioning to prime contractors accelerates, the future of companies relying on internal combustion engine parts, manual shipbuilding processes, and general-purpose chemical products becomes uncertain; however, information on corporate transitions provided to young people is not standardized. If corporate survival and job prospects remain unclear until 2028, young people choose regions where they can build long-term careers, even if current wages are similar. It appears that what young people are avoiding is not manufacturing itself, but rather supply chain jobs with no visible future.

According to an analysis by the Korea Institute for Vocational Education and Training, only about 39% of young people who left the southeastern region to attend university returned, while approximately 61% found employment in the regions from which they originated. Although university mobility has shifted from a temporary educational move to a long-term one that determines one's first job and place of residence, the individual return rate of university students from Ulsan has not been separately verified. If the connection between departments, research, and employment at local universities remains weak for two to three years, the outflow at the high school graduation stage becomes fixed at the employment stage.  The starting point of the outflow of Ulsan youth has shifted from job seeking after graduation to before the selection of a university.

Ulsan's manufacturing industry requires personnel in AI, software, robotics, energy, and materials, yet universities and companies in the Seoul metropolitan area provide education, internships, and first jobs within a single living area. Public flow data linking graduates by major from local universities in Ulsan with hiring by local companies is limited. If learning and employment do not appear to follow a single path by 2028, young people will be integrated into the external labor market starting from the education stage.  While local universities exist as manpower suppliers, the completeness of the pathways for regional settlement remains low.

Ulsan's high-wage industries have grown centered on heavy chemical manufacturing and production technology jobs. While this structure narrows the range of high-paying jobs available to young women compared to knowledge service, content, bio, finance, and digital industries that require diverse majors and skills, data on regional outflows by gender and job type is not sufficiently disclosed. If this industrial portfolio persists for two to three years, the outflow of young women leads simultaneously to a decrease in the fertile population and the skilled workforce.  The youth issue in Ulsan is not a lack of gender-neutral jobs, but rather a problem of an industrial structure that offers an asymmetric range of choices.

Manufacturing AX reduces production jobs while simultaneously creating roles in data, design, software, and services. However, if these roles are assigned to headquarters and research centers in the Seoul metropolitan area rather than the Ulsan factory, regional job diversity will not increase. Unless the regional placement of new AX roles by gender and major is confirmed by 2028, the industrial transformation will remain limited to improving the productivity of the existing workforce rather than attracting young women. Evidence that AX has led to the expansion of the young female labor market in Ulsan is still lacking.

The main destinations for young people moving out of Ulsan were found to be Busan, Seoul, and Gyeongnam. The fact that they move not only to Seoul but also to adjacent regions suggests that these movements cannot be explained solely by housing cost savings or wages at large corporations; rather, they reveal differences in opportunity environments that combine factors such as university education, job roles, social networks, and cultural life. Quantitative comparisons of selection factors by destination are limited. If youth policies remain centered on housing and subsidies for two to three years and a gap in job diversity persists, the direction of net outflow will not change.  The risk of settlement in Ulsan is closer to the narrow range of available life paths than to a shortage of living facilities.

While the 30s age group saw a net inflow of 0.1% in the third quarter of 2025, the 20s age group experienced a net outflow of -1.3%. Ulsan demonstrates a certain level of residential competitiveness once careers, households, and incomes are established, but its competitiveness is low during the stages of education and initial employment. Occupational, housing, and family factors for returnees by age group are not disclosed. If the entry pathways for those in their 20s are not improved by 2028, Ulsan will become entrenched as a city that partially relocates experienced workers from the outside, rather than a city that nurtures and retains its youth.  Ulsan's residential competitiveness is skewed more toward the middle of life than the early life stage.

Ulsan operates a youth policy platform, job creation programs, youth allowances, and a corporate support system. While policy instruments encompass employment, housing, entrepreneurship, and welfare, a net outflow of youth was repeated in every quarter of 2025, and performance indicators linking major, job function, company, and settlement have not been confirmed. If the number of program participants and migration outcomes are not linked for two to three years, the gap between policy readiness and demographic performance will persist.  The level of program readiness is high, but the level of data readiness to influence youth migration is low.

Large corporations in Ulsan are pushing for a transition to AI, robotics, and eco-friendly industries, while local universities are expanding the cultivation of related talent. Although individual preparations in industry and education have been made, a public system for continuously tracking the learning, internships, employment, and settlement of local youth has not been identified. Without path data through 2028, it is impossible to determine at which stage young people drop out.  While preparations exist at the institutional level, preparations at the level of the youth's life path remain incomplete.

Although Ulsan's average monthly wage is among the highest in the nation, the net outflow of people in their 20s has continued. This indicates that the existence of high-wage jobs has not spread to the entire youth population, but wage distributions by large corporations, SMEs, and new hires are not reflected in the regional average. If performance evaluations based on average values ​​continue for two to three years, the perceived lack of jobs for youth is obscured by statistically high wages.  High-wage jobs exist, but the expansion of youth accessibility has not been confirmed.

Even with continued strong production and new investments in the automobile and shipbuilding industries, the trend of net youth outflow persisted. This demonstrates that industrial performance does not automatically spread to youth hiring, job diversity, and regional settlement, yet the net youth employment effect by industry is not disclosed. If the link between investment and youth employment is not confirmed by 2028, manufacturing growth and a decline in the youth population will coexist.  The diffusive effect of the industrial boom on youth employment is limited or unconfirmed.

Research results showing that approximately 61% of young people who migrated to universities outside the southeastern region found employment in their local area demonstrate that university mobility serves as a pathway for fixing employment locations. Even with the expansion of contract departments and field training programs between local universities and companies, no change in the actual return rate of young people from Ulsan has been confirmed. If education programs and net migration statistics are separated for two to three years, the demographic effects of the linked programs cannot be assessed.  Education-employment linkage programs exist, but the spread of return remains unconfirmed.

Ulsan's future manufacturing sector is expanding roles in AI, software, robotics, and eco-friendly energy. However, the employment rates and three-year retention rates of graduates with related majors at local companies are not disclosed in a combined manner. If only initial employment is tallied until 2028 without verification of retention and settlement, short-term hiring results will mask long-term outflows. While  preparations for employment linkage have been made, the sustainability of local career paths remains unconfirmed.

Ulsan's high-wage base is concentrated in large manufacturing conglomerates, whereas Seoul and Busan offer a wide range of choices in service, information, cultural, and professional sectors. The trend of young people moving to destinations dispersed not only to the metropolitan area but also to Busan demonstrates that job choice is a factor beyond just industry-specific wages; however, Ulsan's job diversity index is not publicly disclosed. If only AX jobs within the manufacturing sector increase over the next two to three years without expanding diversity across industries, the outflow will continue. While  Ulsan's job volume indicates high industrial competitiveness, its job portfolio is assessed as being skewed.

While startup, content, tourism, and knowledge service businesses are in operation, evidence of the formation of large-scale high-wage permanent jobs for young people is limited. If the expansion of non-manufacturing jobs remains limited to low-wage, short-term employment, the gap with large manufacturing conglomerates will once again narrow the choices available to young people. If career and wage growth paths are not established in the non-manufacturing sector by 2028, industrial diversification will not lead to settlement effects.  Although non-manufacturing jobs for young people exist, they have not expanded into a career market capable of replacing large manufacturing conglomerates.

Ulsan experienced a continuous net outflow of people in their 20s during the first three quarters of 2025, with the primary destinations being Busan, Seoul, and Gyeonggi. Since new groups of young people are incorporated into external living areas each year through university admission and their first employment, this outflow proceeds cumulatively. Once three cycles of further education and employment pass between 2026 and 2028, the pool of talent capable of returning to the region will shrink further.  The temporal risk to Ulsan's youth policy is not a single year of population decline, but rather three cycles of choices in which life paths become fixed outside the region.

The transition to AX in the automotive, shipbuilding, and petrochemical industries will also restructure job roles during the same period. If young people from Ulsan are unable to participate during the initial placement phase when new roles are created, subsequent hiring will shift to a focus on experienced professionals, but no specific regional placement plans for specific roles have been confirmed. It is highly likely that in two to three years, the organizational structure and talent networks for future roles will become fixed in the Seoul metropolitan area. The  period from 2026 to 2028, when the outflow of youth and the industrial AX transition proceed simultaneously, marks a turning point for Ulsan's talent structure.

University and the first job form networks of relationships involving majors, colleagues, companies, housing, and marriage. Evidence that a large number of university graduates from outside the southeastern region find employment in areas of outflow demonstrates that these post-relocation networks fix the choice of region. Once careers are accumulated outside the region for two to three years, it becomes difficult to induce a return based solely on local job information.  Youth outflow is an irreversible risk where networks and career paths accumulate outside the region, rather than a decrease in population numbers.

The decline in the youth population simultaneously lowers the foundation for new corporate hiring and the ability of universities to retain students and majors. While the reduction of university curricula in turn reduces local corporate hiring and exacerbates the outflow of youth, the critical thresholds for each major are not disclosed. If the number of students and faculty in specific future majors declines by 2028, it will be difficult to restore them in the short term, even after industrial demand arises.  The outflow of youth and the shrinking of the educational base constitute an irreversible cycle in the regional talent ecosystem that reinforces each other.

Compression judgment: The criteria for determining Ulsan Youth Golden Time is not the average city wage, but whether the youth's first job entry rate, future job access rate, 3-year retention rate, and regional return rate improve before 2028.

Ulsan is not a city where young people leave because of low wages. It is judged to be a city where young people leave because, although high wages exist, the paths to accessing those wages—by industry, company, job, and gender—are narrow .

The high average wages of large manufacturing companies demonstrate the performance of existing employees but do not prove the potential for young people's first employment or the breadth of their future careers. In particular, the repeated net outflow of those in their 20s confirms that industrial booms and average urban wages have not translated into competitiveness for settlement in the early stages of life.

The essence of Ulsan's youth problem is not the total amount of jobs, but the disconnect between the high-wage internal labor market and the labor market that young people actually enter .

Golden Time Judgment: High-wage Industrial Strength + Youth Entry-path Collapse Risk

Evidence Sources

• Ministry of Employment and Labor, Wages by City and Province in April 2024
• Statistics Korea, Southeast Region Population Migration Statistics for Q1 2025
• Statistics Korea, Southeast Region Population Migration Statistics for the Second Quarter of 2025
• Statistics Korea, Southeast Region Population Migration Statistics for Q3 2025
• Statistics Korea, Southeast Region Population Migration Statistics for the 4th Quarter of 2024
• Korea Institute for Vocational Education and Training, Labor Mobility and Labor Market Outcomes of Regional University Graduates
• Ministry of Employment and Labor Analyzes Regional Job Polarization and Youth Population Outflow
• Korea Employment Information Service Analyzes Job Changes Due to Industrial Structure Transformation

Structural Insight — Average wages are not opportunities for future youth, but the balance of past industrial success.

Ulsan's high average wage is the result of accumulated wages from long-term employees who entered the internal labor markets of large corporations during the growth of the automobile, shipbuilding, refining, and petrochemical industries. While this figure accurately reflects the city's industrial performance, it does not show the wages young people currently entering the labor market will receive or the probability of entry.

As an industry matures, the productivity and wages of existing employees rise, but the growth rate of new hiring may decrease. With the addition of automation, production and wages remain stable while job opportunities narrow. This creates a structure where indicators of urban wealth and increased opportunities for youth are separated.

Young people compare not the average city wage, but the starting salary of the company they intend to join, the growth potential of the job, and the number of companies they can switch to. If the probability of entering a large corporation is low and the wages, benefits, and future prospects of partner companies are uncertain, Ulsan's high average wage is perceived not as an incentive, but as an insurmountable gap.

Therefore, the structural contradiction in Ulsan is not the phenomenon of young people leaving despite high wages.  The real problem is the time mismatch: while high-wage statistics continue to indicate the past success of industries, the future entry paths for young people are already shrinking.